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Financial Legislation: The Promise and Record of the Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999                                                                                                                   
John A. Tatom 
 
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed the most significant piece of financial 
services regulation to be enacted since the Great Depression, at least up to that time.  
When the Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999, better known as the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), was signed, the financial services industry faced strong 
pressures for deregulation of the rigid structure imposed during the Great Depression. 
During the 2007-08 financial crises and ensuing debate regarding financial services 
regulation, the GLBA became a target as members of the financial sector, academia and 
government considered possible triggers that may have precipitated the crisis. 
The dramatic events that shook the U.S. financial services sector in 2008, including the 
deployment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the failures of some of the 
nation’s largest financial firms, made financial services regulation a heated topic on the 
national policy agenda. In June 2009, the Obama Administration set forth a new proposal 
for financial services regulation [see U.S. Treasury (2009)] and the Congress completed 
action on the reforms in July 2010 in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010, or Dodd-Frank, signed into law on July 21, 2010. While the effects of the 
new legislation are still uncertain, some lessons about the role of legislation and its 
implications can be gleaned from reviewing the experience with the GLBA and the recent 
crisis. Most of the provisions of Dodd-Frank require studies or new regulatory specifics 
from regulatory authorities, an estimated 500 of them in total. Thus, until those new 
regulations are fleshed out, it is difficult to assess the effects of the Act except to assert 
that it is the largest intrusion of federal regulatory authority since the Glass-Steagall Acts 
of 1933 and 1935.
1
 This paper reviews the contribution of the GLBA, its critics and its 
effects on the 2007-08 financial crisis and the new Dodd-Frank legislation.   
Why Regulate Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
After the foreclosure and financial crisis of 2007-09, it may seem strange to ask why 
political leaders might want to regulate banks or other financial institutions. But this 
question does not have an answer that is as obvious as it may seem. There are three main 
reasons that have been put forward as justifications for financial regulation.  The first is 
asymmetric information, that is, that corporations have unequal access to private 
information that belongs to stockholders and this information is necessary for sound 
private decision-making by stockholders and other investors. Regulations aim to avoid 
market failures that would occur if valuable information, which is essentially free or 
relatively inexpensive, but otherwise private, is not provided to markets; such a failure 
                                                 
1
 Developing and promulgating new regulations dictated by Dodd-Frank is not the only obstacle.  Most of 
the issues presented by the financial crisis are unaddressed or not fully addressed by Dodd-Frank so at least 
another major round in regulatory reform can be expected in the next few years in the United States.  These 
include a large number of issues raised about fixing too-big-to-fail and how to repair critical holes in the 
regulation of complex financial institutions, retirement saving and credit default swaps and other new and 
complex instruments, where thoughtful proposals have been developed by the Squam Lake group.  See 
French et al (2006). 
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would reduce capital formation and the size of the corporate sector.  This is the main 
justification for the regulatory authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which was founded in 1934. This explanation leads to informational reporting 
requirements for corporations and disclosure of key financial information that might not 
exist, or might not be uniform, otherwise. Note that this does not lead to a special case for 
regulation of banks or financial institutions, only all corporations.
2
 Some financial 
economists and analysts, however, believe that these issues are more significant for banks 
and other financial institutions. VanHoose (2010) reviews theories of bank regulation and 
concludes that there is no compelling case for “market failure” to warrant a case for bank 
regulation. Market failures arising from large external spillovers, significant market 
power or so-called informational asymmetries are not found in the empirical literature on 
banking. 
 
The second rationale is regulatory capture, where efforts by industry incumbents to use 
legislation and political authority to secure competitive advantages lead to industry 
regulation. In this theory, banking firms demand and use state regulation as a means to 
protect themselves from competitive entry. VanHoose (2010) concludes that this 
alternative theory better explains patterns of bank regulation than the asymmetric 
information theory.  
 
Another rationale for financial regulation is that fractional reserve banking, the fact that 
banks hold cash assets that are a fraction of their liabilities, many of which are payable on 
demand, gives rise to an inherent risk of runs on banks that can lead to failure of 
otherwise solvent banking institutions.  Because of this, legislation providing for 
government insurance of bank deposits was adopted in 1933 to create the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Not surprisingly, this action led to a further justification 
for bank regulation to ensure solvency of banks in order to minimize taxpayer exposure 
to losses of the FDIC should industry paid premiums be insufficient, as, for example, in a 
financial crisis. Such a rationale has led to regulations aimed at limiting competition, 
such as limits on interest rates paid by banks, entry regulation to protect profit, and a 
variety of requirements on asset composition and other operational decisions in order to 
protect bank profitability and avoid losses and insolvency.  This rationale has been 
extended, without serious examination or evidence, to all financial institutions, not just 
banks, by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the U.S. Treasury, with tacit endorsement by the 
Congress, to encompass the notion that financial institutions can be “too interconnected,” 
so that shocks in some part of the industry can lead to failures elsewhere.  This may 
appear to be similar to the “bank runs” problem, but it is not. There is no end to the 
potential for losses due to interconnectedness, whether in banking, the rest of the 
financial industry or even non-financial business, because all consumers and producers 
are connected to varying degrees to others consumers and producers. 
 
                                                 
2
 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006), based on a data set of 150 countries, conclude that regulation based 
upon disclosure and market-based monitoring provide superior outcomes based on a broad range of 
desirable regulatory outcomes.  Regulations employing entry restrictions, government ownership or 
restrictions on banking activities, such as those arising from regulatory capture adversely affect banking 
system performance.     
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VanHoose (2010) points out that another rationale for financial regulation, consumer 
protection, is inadequate. He quotes Benston (2000), who wrote that “most nations 
already have broad social regulations to address such issues.”3 This rationale was an 
important component of the GLBA and more recently of Dodd-Frank.  VanHoose cites 
studies that show that the cost of bank regulation is substantial relative to overall bank 
expenses; these estimates are striking given the popular notion that deregulation since the 
1970s has reduced regulatory costs to negligible levels. 
 
Looking Back at The GLBA – Great Expectations and Some Skepticism 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which created the FDIC and other significant banking 
reforms, contained provisions that prohibited a bank holding company from owning other 
financial companies.  The GLBA repealed these legal separations, allowing bank holding 
companies to own insurance, financial planning/investment firms and other financial 
service businesses. The “financial holding company” structure allowed banks, securities 
firms and insurance companies to offer each other’s products. For example, a bank could 
create a financial services holding company to offer insurance or security services; and an 
insurance company could provide retail or investment banking services. Essentially, the 
GLBA broke down the barriers to competition across the financial services portfolio. 
 
The authors of the GLBA expected that the Act would enhance competition between 
firms and allow financial services to be provided more efficiently through a streamlined 
enterprise. The emergence of electronic and Internet-based banking services largely 
negated many of the barriers that had served to make banking a geographic-based 
delivery system in the past, even without the GLBA. By providing consumers with a “one 
stop shop” where they could take care of all of their financial business, the GLBA was 
intended to optimize consumer convenience. Under the GLBA, banks, insurance 
companies, security companies and investment banks could offer their customers 
products and services beyond their traditional product portfolios.  Besides, enhanced 
competition and efficiency, many thought that the GLBA would open the doors for more 
product innovation. The reasoning was that if bank holding companies were able to offer 
a broader menu of products, they would be inclined to develop new products that would 
meet customers’ evolving needs while generating additional revenue for the bank.  
 
The primary innovations that arose from the GLBA were changes in how products were 
distributed as opposed to the development of new products. Under the Act, retail banks, 
investment banks, insurance companies and securities firms, were able to leverage 
economies of scope and scale to distribute traditional products from other sectors to 
better serve the portfolio of financial needs of their customers. This increased 
competition in distribution resulted in lower profit margins but also provided new profit 
centers in each sector of the industry. For example, while community banks increased 
marketing of insurance products and security services, they tended to secure these 
services from external sources as opposed to developing the services in-house. This 
arrangement resulted in security and insurance companies enjoying a sales boost as other 
institutions promoted their products. Money center and super regional banks benefited 
                                                 
3
 See VanHoose (2010), p. 198.  
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from the ease of expanded sales of both variable and fixed annuities and development of 
their own security products. 
 
The GLBA allowed banks to develop private equity businesses that could hold 
investments for up to ten years, allowing banks to provide equity financing to small and 
medium-sized firms. Additionally, the Act made it easier for banks of all sizes to 
underwrite municipal securities and develop securities sales and origination services, as 
well as insurance products. Likewise, insurance companies used the GLBA to cultivate 
new revenue streams. Met Life became one of the largest financial holding companies. 
Allstate Insurance’s interstate bank emerged as a truly national competitor in retail 
banking services by using its agent network to cross-sell banking services. 
 
The ability to provide bank financing to investment banks’ corporate clients was an 
attractive service for large corporations which increased competition for investment 
banking services. However, not all investment banks actually became part of financial 
holding companies with banking affiliates. This changed after the financial crisis arose. 
Following the failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, two investment banks 
without significant attachments to bank affiliates, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
became bank holding companies. Today there is no major investment bank that exists 
outside of a financial holding company structure.  As the credit crisis continued, 
commercial bank charters offered the attractive benefit of immediate access to liquid 
funds through the Federal Reserve. The GLBA made possible the bank mergers that 
quickly and efficiently resolved two of the largest institutional failures in the financial 
crisis, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch.  
 
A key financial innovation brought about by the financial integration permitted by the 
GLBA was reduced systematic risk.
4
 Stock prices rose for banks, insurance companies 
and security firms on the passage of the GLBA. Bank stocks, especially money center 
and super regional bank stocks, gained the most, followed by insurance companies and 
then security firms. Meanwhile, overseas insurers’ stock prices dropped significantly. 
Evidence shows that part of the gain in rates of return on stocks was due to lower 
systematic risk premiums associated with these firms.  
As with most new legislation, the GLBA was not accepted warmly by all portions of the 
industry. One of the primary concerns in the drafting and eventual passage of the GLBA 
was the protection of customer privacy. Critics questioned whether the vast amount of 
information held by one institution would compromise the privacy of account holders. 
Extensive restrictions on intra- and inter-company sharing of customer information were 
included in the Act to address these concerns.  
Another criticism was that the GLBA was enacted to formalize a fait accompli – the 
merger of Citibank and Travelers Group to create Citigroup, announced in 1998.  
However, this was not true. The merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp was approved 
by the Fed on the basis that “non-permitted businesses would be divested within a pre-
                                                 
4
 See Hassan, Mamun and Isik, Chapter 4 below, and Hassan and Mamun, Chapter 5 below, as well as their 
references to other studies.     
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defined time frame.” The passage of the GLBA eased the burden of an agreement that 
had already been negotiated and eliminated the concerns about the cost or difficulties of 
complying with the divesture requirements.  
A third concern was that the GLBA would enable large mega-institutions to dominate 
commercial banking, investment banking, brokerage and insurance business. By creating 
“superstore” banks, some feared that smaller institutions including community banks 
would not be able to compete.   
 
Did The GLBA Achieve its Intentions? 
Interestingly, many of the outcomes of the GLBA did not play out as both authors and 
critics thought they might.  The GLBA did not result in a rush of financial services firms 
delving into new lines of business, except among the largest institutions. Beyond notable 
mergers (e.g. Citigroup and Travelers, JP Morgan and Chase) the industries’ response 
was primarily in the sale of nontraditional products, rather than the “manufacturing” of 
new products.  As of June 29, 2009, there were only 592 financial holding companies 
authorized by the Federal Reserve, and most of them were small and had limited 
availability of nontraditional products.     
The GLBA seems to have been more effective at fostering product delivery than creating 
new types of products. Around the same time that the GLBA was being introduced, new 
technology was providing the financial services industry with sophisticated tools such as 
marketing customer information files (MCIF) and data warehousing programs. These 
tools made it easy for marketers to categorize customers by life-stage and create bundles 
of products tailored to life-stages or product usage. For example, a customer with an auto 
loan would be a prime candidate to cross-sell an insurance policy to; a senior club 
member might be interested in a money market or other high-yield deposit account.   
To some extent, primarily through acquisition, holding companies were formed to allow 
broader menus of products to be manufactured in house. However, over time, many 
institutions have opted to source specific financial products from specialists, focusing on 
the distribution of products in response to consumer needs.  
 
Skeptics’ concerns about privacy have also not borne out. The newly-formed Citigroup 
led the way in crafting privacy restrictions that are included in the GLBA. The three 
principal parts to the privacy requirements of the GLBA include the Financial Privacy 
Rule, Safeguards Rule and pretexting provisions. The language and restrictions within 
each section of the Act’s privacy components seem to have served their purpose in 
protecting customer information from wide dissemination across subsidiaries.  
 
The GLBA and the Financial Crisis  
As the financial crisis emerged, debate arose regarding any role that the Act may have 
played in creating products that were not by definition innovative, but rather, 
controversial, or other changes that may have contributed to the crisis. Some questioned 
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whether the innovation that the GLBA fostered had included financial products linked to 
the subprime crisis – specifically mortgage loans and the array of new investment 
products created during the housing bubble. It must be noted that rapid growth in home 
buying and thus the growth in mortgage assets was a result of public policy pressures to 
increase homeownership in the U.S.  The resulting growth of mortgage companies, 
especially some tied to real estate companies and to thrift institutions, led to substantial 
changes in the processing of mortgage applications and to new channels of financing at 
increasingly competitive prices. This trend was reinforced by banks’ movement away 
from the “originate and hold” model to an “originate and distribute” model. Under the 
new model, banks made and serviced mortgage loans, but sold the loans to investment 
banks and government sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who in 
turn packaged the loans into pools against which they issued securitized mortgages. 
These purchasers, especially some investment banks, went one or more steps further, 
pooling these securities to create collateralized debt obligations and even more esoteric 
versions of these instruments. The initial mortgage securitization instruments and process 
were not new, however; they had existed for 15 to 20 years. What was new and especially 
problematical was including risky subprime mortgages and especially adjustable rate 
subprime mortgages, in these packages. Adjustable rate subprime loans grew rapidly in 
2004-2007 just as market interest rates were rising, so that earlier loans of this type were 
resetting to, in many cases, unaffordable levels.     
 
These new products were the creation of investment banks that could have developed 
them with or without the GLBA. And they were part of a pattern of new instruments 
developed there that failed when a more normal appetite for credit risk returned to 
markets in 2007 and subsequently. The illiquidity of instruments like auction rate 
securities, structured finance products was stunning following the rapid growth of such 
new products during the previous few years as investors abandoned caution in search of 
yield on their investments in what was essentially a very low rate of return environment. 
Riskier and higher yielding new assets became the rage.   
Even though none of these new instruments could be linked to the GLBA, some critics 
were quick to blame the law for the financial crisis.  Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman lays 
blame on Senator Gramm, the lead author of the GLBA, and on the GLBA noting:  “Aha: 
the Politico notices that Phil Gramm, McCain’s presidential economic guru, can also be 
viewed as the father of the financial crisis.”5  Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph 
Stiglitz called for the repeal of the GLBA in the January 2009 issue of Vanity Fair. While 
political opposition to the GLBA exists, no political leader stepped forward to champion, 
repeal or revision of the GLBA. President Barak Obama, while a presidential candidate in 
2008, expressed the view that the GLBA was responsible for the mortgage crisis, but 
neither he nor congressional leaders followed up with the repeal of the GLBA.
6
  Henry 
Kaufman argues that the GLBA caused the crisis and advocates a return to a narrow bank 
regime in line with the Glass-Steagall regulatory structure.
7
 Paul Volcker has also 
                                                 
5
 See Krugman (2009).   
6
 See Paletta and Scannell (2009). 
7
 See Kaufman (2010).  
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expressed regret over the passage of the GLBA and the failure of Dodd-Frank to repeal 
it.
8
 
One could argue that the partial adoption of the Volcker Rule, which would have 
prohibited banks from conducting private equity, hedge fund or proprietary trading 
businesses, in Dodd-Frank reflected a repeal of the most dangerous elements of the 
GLBA. This would be wrong, however, for at least two reasons.  First, Volcker did not 
regard his original proposal as repealing the GLBA,
9
 and second, Dodd-Frank did not 
implement the Volcker Rule. Instead it put limits on the extent of two of these businesses, 
with private equity and hedge fund assets limited to no more than 3 percent of total 
assets, required these activities to be conducted in separate subsidiaries, and eliminated 
proprietary trading activities of banks. The latter is hard to define and is likely to prove 
difficult to eliminate since similar activities are routinely conducted in other traditional 
parts of the asset management of banks. Its effectiveness will be determined, as so much 
of Dodd-Frank, by regulators’ new processes to enforce it.   
Opposition to the GLBA appears to be more advanced in Britain, where the Tory 
leadership is advocating adoption of a Glass-Steagall type separation of banking from 
financial services. This is unique in that the British financial system has not had such a 
separation structure in the past.  George Osborne, new Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
advocated this approach when he was shadow Chancellor, as did the former Tory 
Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, who noted “Capitalism needs a revived Glass-Steagall Act.”10 
Nonetheless, when the Tories came to power in June 2010, adoption of a policy like 
Glass Steagall was not part of the program.   
The mortgage crisis arose because of the growth of subprime mortgage products 
developed by mortgage bankers and investment banks, most of them unregulated, and 
whose products were certainly not under the auspices of the GLBA provisions that 
govern bank holding companies or of other commercial banking laws. Significant 
pressure from Congress, supported by mandates and federal subsidies to foster 
homeownership helped accelerate the growth and development of subprime products.   
As a result of the growth in home ownership and specifically the growth of subprime 
mortgage assets, incentives were created for investment banks to develop financial 
products to leverage and manage their mortgage portfolios. These products were often 
created by nontraditional companies and thus, marketed outside of traditional regulatory 
structures. These new products included subprime-based mortgage backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligations, collateralized loan obligations, auction rate securities and 
credit default swaps. While some of these products were sound, many were complex and 
unknown, creating a misunderstood risk profile.   
                                                 
8
 See Uchitelle (2010). Volcker has argued elsewhere that financial deregulation introduced no new 
innovations beyond the automatic teller machine, but in this article cites derivatives, securitizations and 
credit default swaps as products that did not exist before deregulation. 
9
 See Uchitelle (2010).  
10
 See Lawson (2009).   
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Indeed, during the crisis, the large failures of institutions occurred not among banks, but 
among non-bank financial conglomerates such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch and American International Group (AIG). In short, the financial crisis was the 
result of poor regulation of new intermediaries acting outside the traditional regulatory 
structure that existed before and after the GLBA. The GLBA did not deregulate the 
financial services industry beyond allowing for integration of institutions across product 
lines. As Wallison points out in the next chapter, without the GLBA, the failures of 
investment banks and large thrift institutions would not have been so easily resolved and 
the spillover to all financial institutions and the economy would have been severe.   
The notion that the financial crisis was a banking crisis has been fostered by the political 
posturing of both the Bush and Obama administrations, led by the adoption and 
implementation of TARP.  The TARP program began by forcing banks and a few non-
bank financial institutions to accept government funds without evidence that they were 
confronting any meaningful liquidity or solvency problems. Most of the banks paid back 
these funds as soon as they were allowed. While TARP had authority to spend up to $700 
billion, originally to acquire toxic assets of banks, less than $300 billion was ever 
disbursed to banks, most of that was repaid with the next 18 months and in 2010 losses to 
TARP were projected to arise from funds provided to automobile producers and AIG, 
with little loss arising from funds advanced to commercial banks.   
Another perspective on whether there was a GLBA or financial-crisis-induced failure of 
banks is that the failure experience of depository institutions (banks and thrifts) has not 
risen to the level of the last real crisis, the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  In a new broad historical review of financial crises, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) refer to the S&L crisis as a “bank-centered financial crisis” and they 
include it in their comparison of the subprime crisis to such crises. It must be noted that 
they use the term “milder,” and not their terms “severe” or “systemic,” in referring to the 
S&L crisis and they conclude that the subprime crisis was worse than other banking 
crises in advanced countries or in the five crises that they call the “Big Five,” “severe,” 
and “systemic,” crises. Certainly this suggests that the subprime crisis was the worst 
since at least Great Depression, but one natural indicator that Reinhart and Rogoff do not 
review, the number of bank failures, suggests otherwise.  In 2008-09 there were 135 
failures (there were only three in 2007, the first year of the crisis), and it is likely that 
there will be 170-200 failures in 2010. It is possible that, in 2010, the number of failures 
will reach or surpass the previous high of 179 in 1992, which came toward the end of the 
S&L crisis.  But a total of 300-350 failures for 2008-2010 pales in comparison with the 
three to four times larger number of failures in the worst three years of the S&L crisis 
(1989-1991) , or the six times larger number of failures during the worst five years of the 
earlier crisis, 1808 in 1987-92.  For the full 13-year period of elevated bank failures from 
1981-93, there were 2,335 failures, about seven times as many as are likely in and 
following the subprime/financial crisis. At least for this indicator of banking crisis, the 
recent mortgage and financial crisis is hugely dwarfed by the so-called mild S&L bank-
centered financial crisis. 
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A supporting view is offered by Bullard (2010), who argues that commercial banks, 
especially the smaller community banks, did not cause the crisis and do not need to be 
reregulated. He points out that 20 financial firms made up 80 percent of the assets of the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 at the end of 2007. Only one third of the assets of these financial 
firms were controlled by bank holding companies, regulated by the Fed, while two thirds 
were non-bank financial firms, which are not in the bank regulatory system and not under 
the authority of the Fed. In his view, there were runs on the shadow banking system and 
these and the non-bank financial firms caused the crisis. He does not recognize that the 
Fed did have regulatory control over the holding companies, though he is correct that 
they did not have authority over non-bank financial firms. 
Dodd-Frank provides more authority for the Fed and FDIC to close bank holding 
companies and other financial firms, but it is not likely that this will be the end of “too 
big to fail” (TBTF) despite claims that it will. The experience in the recent crisis 
extended the notion of TBTF to non-banks and even to non-financial firms, such as auto 
companies. Improved discretionary ability to close banks and bank holding companies 
was unnecessary and expanded discretionary control to close other financial and non-
financial companies is not likely to be used in the event of another crisis. The only new 
power is the ability to use a discretionary threat to private sector firms that is likely to be 
abused in ways that are wholly unrelated to a real financial crisis.  Fortunately, this 
congressional overreach is unlikely to survive future judicial challenge.   
The Profitability Perspective 
How did the GLBA impact U.S. banks’ overall profitability? Despite gains in stock 
prices, there is no conclusive evidence that profitability or productivity rose for the 
banking industry as a whole. From an asset growth perspective, however, total assets of 
all banks grew at an 8.1 percent annual rate from 1999 to 2008, much faster than the 
gross domestic product (GDP) (4.9%). Assets at the nation’s four largest holding 
companies (Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo) grew more 
than twice as fast, however, expanding at a rate of 16.6 percent, more than three times as 
fast as the economy’s GDP. The rest of the banking industry grew a little more slowly 
than the overall economy, with assets expanding at a 4 percent rate.    
 
Certainly, the GLBA appears to have helped create jobs in the financial services sector. 
Prior to the GLBA (1987-99), employment in the financial services sector grew more 
slowly than overall employment, reflecting stagnation within the industry. However, 
from 1999 to 2007, financial services employment outpaced overall employment, 
reflecting the improving performance of the financial sector.   
 
An increased level of competition within the banking sector is also indicated by the 
decline in net interest margins. From 1984 to 1999, the average net interest margin of all 
commercial banks was 4.17 percent. This number declined sharply (54 basis points) after 
the GLBA, averaging 3.63 percent from 1999 through the second quarter of 2009. The 
transformation of banking is reflected in a sharp shift in the importance of traditional 
financial intermediation (borrowing and lending) toward more fee income from services 
such as insurance and security sales, origination fees and service fees for overdrafts, 
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loans of credit and other services. From 1969 to 1986, the share of interest income in total 
commercial bank income was about 90 percent. As the GLBA removed walls separating 
banks, insurance and securities firms, the share of interest income fell to 72 percent in 
1999 and to 64 percent in 2003. Since then, the share rose to 73 percent in 2008 as 
traditional banking has reasserted its importance. 
 
Senator Gramm laid out a market test of the future success of the GLBA: 
The test that I believe we should use – the test I will use, the test I hope people 
looking at this bill years in the future will use – is, 'Did it produce a greater 
diversity of products and services for American consumers? Were those products 
better? And did they sell at a lower price?' I think if the answer to those three 
questions is yes, then this bill will have succeeded.
11
  
 
According to the evidence above, the GLBA was a success, especially for the largest 
banks. On the other hand, Gramm’s ultimate test of its success is its survival, though his 
explanation has come under a cloud of doubt, at least temporarily, because of the 
mortgage and financial crisis. Gramm argued,  
 
Ultimately, the final judge of the bill is history. Ultimately, as you look at the bill, 
you have to ask yourself, 'Will people in the future be trying to repeal it, as we are 
here today trying to repeal – and hopefully repealing – Glass-Steagall?’ I think the 
answer will be no. I think it will be no because we are doing something very 
different from Glass-Steagall. Glass-Steagall, in the midst of the Great 
Depression, thought government was the answer. In this period of economic 
growth and prosperity, we believe freedom is the answer.
12
 
 
The GLBA survived the assault of leading intellectual and political critics in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, at least in their post-crisis reform efforts.   
 
What about “Wallet Share”? 
An early concern upon passage of the GLBA was that financial behemoths would take 
over the financial services industry. By 2009, only about 600 mostly small local and 
regional financial holding companies exist to facilitate cross-sector product availability. 
There is some question whether even this small number really provides full service 
product availability. The expansion of new products and services allowed by the GLBA 
has not resulted in increased products per household within institutions. Banks did not 
lure large numbers of customers away from insurance firms, nor did insurance companies 
lure significant numbers of customers away from traditional banks. As a result, the 
GLBA has not resulted in a meaningful diversification of product shares within 
individual firms.  
 
The GLBA may have helped foster customer retention. While customers appear to have a 
preference for doing business with specialists across the product spectrum, customers 
who have concentrated their buying across banking, insurance or securities within a 
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 See Simpson (2009). 
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 See Simpson (2009).  
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single holding company are likely to be more loyal, and less likely to flee when they 
encounter a more attractive offer for a single product.  
 
Examining the Legacy 
Like most regulation, the GLBA has been both condoned and vilified, particularly in the 
context of the economic meltdown. However, the GLBA appears to have been a 
significant factor in supporting the vigor and health of U.S. banks by enabling them to 
deliver products and services that enhance competition and deliver the services 
consumers demand. Notably, the solvency of the nation’s banks has improved 
dramatically in the past decade. Banks reached an historical peak in their ratio of capital 
to assets, or lowest leverage ratio, in mid 2008 – about the same time the financial 
meltdown was capturing national headlines.  Over the past 10 years, the GLBA has 
played a role in the growth of the U.S. banking industry, making it more internationally 
competitive and more resilient to economic and financial shocks. Despite its critics, the 
GLBA has increased innovation as well as enhanced the convenience of financial 
services for both consumers and businesses. The GLBA broke down restrictive barriers 
brought about during the Great Depression. Despite the criticisms of the GLBA during 
the financial crisis and early stages of the legislative debate for financial regulatory 
reform, no effort to repeal the GLBA surfaced.   
 
In the development of the GLBA, primary concerns focused on consumer protection and 
privacy issues. Today, systemic risk, subprime credit and mortgage credit crisis issues 
introduce new concerns. Dodd-Frank created a new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, housed within the Federal Reserve, but independent of them. The new bureau 
will have power to write regulation, examine and enforce it for banks, thrifts and credit 
unions with assets over $10 billion, mortgage-related businesses, payday lenders and 
certain non-bank financial firms, though auto dealers are explicitly exempt. Dodd-Frank 
did not retire or consolidate any of the existing financial regulatory bodies, however, 
except for merging the federal chartering and regulation of thrifts with that of banks 
within the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in the U.S. Department of 
Treasury. This transfers consumer protection rules for thrifts to oversight by the OCC, as 
well as the new bureau. Thus, Dodd-Frank continues the pursuit of stronger consumer 
protection regulation and in this regard it touches on one area that some analysts believed 
contributed to the mortgage and financial crisis of 2007-09, the concern to protect 
consumers from predatory lending.  There is no evidence that predatory lending 
contributed to the mortgage crisis, however, as predation with unsustainable mortgage 
lending ran from borrowers to lenders and to mortgage-backed asset investors.     
 
As new regulatory structures are considered, these “new” questions will need to be 
addressed. The subprime crisis was largely due to credit extensions among mortgage 
bankers and thrift institutions. Additionally, the creation of complex new products such 
as mortgage-backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations, collateralized debt 
obligations, auction rate securities and credit default swaps were developed and marketed 
outside traditional regulatory structures. These gaps will certainly be considered in any 
new system of regulation and oversight. 
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On the other hand, some analysts have noted that, without the GLBA, the ability of the 
financial system to insulate investors from larger losses and instability would have been 
more restricted [see Wallison (2009), for example]. Some banks that had extensive 
investment banking operations have experienced relatively large losses (Citigroup, Bank 
of America); but, it was the largely non-bank affiliated Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers whose failure is most closely linked to the financial crisis. 
 
Looking forward, new regulation may or may not affect the GLBA. As noted above, 
Dodd-Frank did not alter the financial structure or other aspects of the GLBA very much. 
Dodd-Frank left the product offerings of financial institutions largely intact. The 
exceptions are that banks will no longer be able to undertake proprietary trading and their 
offerings of hedge fund services and private equity services will each be limited to 3 
percent of total assets. Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Fed and adviser to President 
Obama, had recommended that all three of these activities be prohibited in the new 
legislation.  Instead, only proprietary trading was prohibited and the other activities were 
limited.  Of these three activities, only private equity had been expanded for U.S. banks 
in the GLBA.  
 
In 2008, Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson’s Blueprint [(see U.S. Treasury (2008)] 
called for a move to regulation by risk type rather than function, referred to as a move 
from functional regulation to objectives-based regulation. Essentially, the regulatory 
structure had remained unchanged by the GLBA, regulating various financial firms along 
product lines, despite the possibility of merging products lines under the GLBA. These 
regulatory “silos,” regulating according to types of products rather than types of risk were 
a target of the Paulson Blueprint. This proposal did not survive into the Obama proposal 
of 2009 [see U.S. Treasury (2009)], though there was otherwise broad agreement in the 
two regulatory reform proposals and indeed, Dodd-Frank incorporated many of the 
proposals in both documents. For example, Dodd-Frank consolidated the Office of Thrift 
Supervision in the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and ended the thrift charter, as 
both sets of proposals had agreed earlier. It also set up a Federal Office of National 
Insurance to serve as a national center for insurance information and federal policy, as 
well as a coordinator for federal insurance policy in international policy coordination. 
Perhaps most importantly, it established a separate and independent consumer protection 
regulator, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as both earlier proposals had 
recommended and, most notably, the most significant aspect of the Paulson plan’s 
objectives-based regulation that carried through to the new legislation. 
 
Another component of the objectives-based regulatory structure proposed in the Blueprint 
called for a regulator of financial stability. Dodd-Frank includes a Financial Stability 
Oversight Council composed of all the various existing regulators and chaired by the 
Secretary of Treasury. It does not abolish the Fed’s role in monitoring and controlling 
financial stability, however, as envisioned by the Blueprint. Creation of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and the Financial Stability Oversight Council may be only 
the first steps in moving toward the new structure envisioned in the Blueprint.  However, 
the Blueprint’s notion of having a single regulator for prudential regulation suffered a 
major setback in its omission from the Obama proposals, its omission from Dodd-Frank, 
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and from the abolition of the Financial Services Authority, the world’s leading example 
of an objectives-based regulator, in favor of moving prudential regulation back under the 
Bank of England, the central bank and principal institution for financial stability. 
  
Despite the criticism that the GLBA contributed to the financial crisis, the only two large 
investment banks that were not previously part of financial holding companies (Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs) became financial holding companies in order to improve 
their strength during the crisis. Smaller investment banks that do not also function as 
banks may remain so over the next decade if they survive as independent investment 
banks. Several large financial holding companies have emerged over the past ten years 
including JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo. There are 
about seven large foreign universal banks that rely primarily on deposit taking but also 
have securities. It is likely that efforts to expand product offerings, which have continued 
over more than three decades, will continue, even among the large financial holding 
companies. Moreover, some midsize and small banks will continue to offer a broad 
portfolio of financial products and services. Whether financial holding companies will 
remain so in the future will depend in part on how new regulations under Dodd-Frank 
play out.  Since all financial institutions are now subject to the Fed’s new financial 
oversight and the new law gives significance to the Fed’s notion of financial firms, 
broadly conceived, being “too interdependent to fail,” there will be little advantage to 
being a bank, a bank holding or a financial holding company and only more regular and 
pervasive costs associated with the tighter oversight of bank and bank holding 
companies. While the Fed could intervene, it is likely that as time makes the financial 
crisis and passage of Dodd-Frank more distant, some large financial firms that specialize 
in non-bank activity may give up their status as a financial holding company with a 
commercial bank affiliate.   
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